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CALIFORNIA'S LIMITS ON THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
LIFE SAVING TREATMENT
"No HOLDS BARRED?"
Thor v. Superior Court,
855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993) (en banc)
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that individuals cannot be deprived of their liberty
without due process of law.' The common law underscores the
import of individual liberty2 by recognizing that competent
individuals have a fundamental right to refuse to consent to
medical treatment .3 A competent person, therefore, has a pro-
tected liberty interest 4 in refusing medical treatment even if doing
so will cause or hasten death.5 The U.S. Supreme Court, how-
ever, has authorized states to determine the parameters of an
individual's liberty interest vis-A-vis countervailing state inter-
ests. 6 In Thor v. Superior Court,7 the California Supreme Court
1. "No State shall . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
2. The common law right of self-determination is best defined in terms
of the right to control one's own person. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250, 251 (1891). In Botsford, the Supreme Court stated: "No right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person..
Id. at 251.
3. The doctrine of informed consent grew out of the common law tort
of battery, which prohibits the nonconsensual touching of another. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18(1) (1965). The doctrine of informed
consent requires a doctor to disclose all of the risks involved in undergoing
medical treatment to the patient. See ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Ctr.,
499 P.2d 1, 8 (Wash. 1972) (en banc). This provides the patient with the
opportunity to reasonably balance the probable risks against the probable
benefits in deciding whether to undergo or to forego treatment. Id. Thus,
courts generally recognize the doctrine as a corollary to the notion of personal
autonomy. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 270 (1990) (explaining that the principle of personal autonomy is incor-
porated in the doctrine of informed consent); Barber v. Superior Court, 195
Cal. Rptr. 484, 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that the competent patient's
right to refuse medical treatment is "the obvious corollary" to the principle
of actionable battery resulting from a doctor's treatment of a patient absent
informed consent).
4. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 n.7 (5-4 decision) (declining to hold that
individuals have a privacy interest in refusing life-sustaining treatment).
5. The Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of a competent person's
liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment. Id. at 279.
6. An individual's "liberty interest" under the Due Process Clause is not
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held that the liberty interest of a competent quadriplegic state
prisoner in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment outweighs
any countervailing state or prison interests in administering such
treatment.8  o
The petitioner in Thor worked as a staff physician in a
California prison medical facility. 9 A quadriplegic prisoner under
Dr. Thor's care 0 refused to be fed or medicated." The doctor
sought a court order' 2 permitting him to artificially feed and
medicate the prisoner. 3 The superior court denied the petition,
holding that the prisoner had a right to refuse medical treat-
ment.' 4 Refusing to grant the petitioner a writ of mandate, the
California Court of Appeals affirmed the prisoner's right to
refuse treatment, including sustenance. 5 Sitting en banc, the
California Supreme Court upheld both of the lower courts'
absolute. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279-81. The Supreme Court found that Missouri
could constitutionally require proof by clear and convincing evidence of an
incompetent patient's desire for withdrawal of treatment. Id. at 281.
7. 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
8. Id. at 384.
9. Id. at 379. The doctor had standing to seek a court order against the
prisoner because the state is ultimately subject to liability for the physician's
acts. Id. at 380 n.4.
10. The real party in interest, Howard Andrews, was serving a life term
in prison when he suffered injuries rendering him a quadriplegic. Id. at 379.
11. Andrews intermittently refused to eat and receive his medication during
the months following his injury. Id. As a result, he suffered severe weight
loss. Id.
12. The doctor instituted an ex parte proceeding in the Superior Court of
Solano County. Thor, 855 P.2d at 379. When the doctor sought a writ of
mandate from the California Court of Appeals, the court appointed special
counsel to represent the prisoner. Id. On appeal, Dr. Thor asserted that he
had a duty, under both California regulatory authority and the federal
constitution, to administer any procedure he deemed necessary to maintain
the health of prisoners in his care. Id. at 379-80.
Specifically, California law permits state prison officials to force medical
treatment over the objection of mentally competent inmates only when im-
mediate action is necessary to save the life of, or avoid serious damage to,
an inmate. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3351 (1992).
Additionally, the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits
"cruel and unusual punishment" to prisoners. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII. The
U.S. Supreme Court has held that a prison's "deliberate indifference" to a
prisoner's serious medical treatment constitutes "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104 (1976).
13. Thor sought an order allowing him to perform a surgical procedure
that involved the insertion of a feeding tube, or other instrument, to expedite
artificial feeding. Thor, 855 P.2d at 379.
14. Id.
15. Id. The court of appeals relied on Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) and Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr.
220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). Id.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/16
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dismissals of the petition, declaring that absent an actual threat
to prison security, a prisoner has a right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment. 6
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,7
the Supreme Court lodged the responsibility of determining the
parameters of an individual's right to refuse life-sustaining med-
ical treatment in the "laboratory" of the states.18 Cruzan was
the Court's first opportunity to address the question of an
incompetent individual's right to withdraw life-sustaining treat-
ment.' 9 Declining to address every aspect of an individual's
"right to die,"' 2 the Court narrowly held that it was not
unconstitutional for Missouri to require guardians of an incom-
petent person to provide clear and convincing proof that the
incompetent person would consent to withdrawal of life-sustain-
ing treatment. 2' Presuming that competent individuals have a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing life saving
treatment, 22 the Court concluded that states are better equipped
16. The court, however, did not extend its holding to otherwise healthy
prisoners who bring about their own demise. Thor, 855 P.2d at 385-86, 389
n.16. For example, the court's holding does not extend to healthy prisoners
who engage in a hunger strike or voluntarily starve themselves and later need
artificial feeding to stay alive. Id. at 389 n.16.
17. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
18. Id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
19. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277.
20. The Court referred to the right to refuse life-saving medical treatment
as the right to die. Id. At least one commentator, however, has distinguished
the right to die from the right to refuse life-saving medical treatment. John
L. Capone, Note, Bartling v. Superior Court: The Final Transgression of a
Patient's Right to Die?, 35 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 764, 764 n.4 (1985) (arguing
that such a distinction may be relevant to determine a patient's intent).
21. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280. The Court concluded that because Missouri
has adopted an unqualified policy of preserving life, it may impose a more
stringent standard of proof in furtherance of its policy. Id.
22. It is important to note that the Cruzan Court assumed but did not
hold that competent individuals have a liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining
treatment. Id. at 279. See also Thomas A. Eaton & Edward J. Larson,
Experimenting with the "Right To Die" in the Laboratory of the States, 25
GA. L. REv. 1253, 1263-64 (1991) (noting that the Cruzan majority opinion
did not explicitly decide whether an individual has a constitutionally protected
right to die); Cathaleen A. Roach, Paradox and Pandora's Box: The Tragedy
of Current Right-To-Die Jurisprudence, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 133, 140 (1991)
(observing that the majority holding in Cruzan is notable for what it did not
say); John N. Suhr, Jr., Note, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health: A Clear and Convincing Callfor Comprehensive Legislation to Protect
Incompetent Patients' Rights, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1477, 1504 n.140 (1991)
(coming to the conclusion that the Court created this right by reading Cruzan
with other decisions).
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to determine the proper limits of this liberty interest. 23
Courts acknowledged early on that countervailing state inter-
ests temper an individual's right to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment. 24 The majority of courts, however, have held that in
certain circumstances individuals may exercise this right irre-
spective of state interests. 21 For example, in Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,26 the Massachusetts Su-
preme Court held that the right of a terminally ill patient to
freedom from bodily intrusion outweighed countervailing state
interests. 27 The court balanced the patient's right to privacy 2
and self-determination against countervailing state interests in
preserving life, preventing suicide, maintaining the ethical integ-
rity of the medical profession, and protecting innocent third
parties. 29 The court distinguished between a terminally ill person,
23. The Court observed that "[s]tate courts have available to them a
number of sources - state constitutions, statutes and common law - that
the [Supreme Court] does not have" at its disposal to determine what rules
to apply in these situations. The Supreme Court's only source is the U.S.
Constitution. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277.
24. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417 (Mass. 1977), was the first major decision to delineate state interests vis-
A-vis those of an individual. The seminal case, In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647(N.J. 1976), however., was the first to declare that an incompetent person has
a constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. The Saikewicz
court adopted much of its analysis from Quinlan. See Eaton & Larson, supra
note 22, at 1257-62 (discussing the significance of Quinlan and Saikewicz and
characterizing the opinions as the "basic analytic building blocks" of the right
to die).
25. Almost every decision since 1976 has upheld a patient's right to refuse
treatment. Eaton & Larson, supra note 22, at 1262 (discussing the role of
state constitutional law in right to die cases). See also Suhr, supra note 22,
at 1479 n.3 (citing several cases upholding a competent individual's right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment).
26. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
27. Id. at 435.
28. Prior to Cruzan, numerous courts held that patients had a privacy
interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment. See, e.g., Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Bartling v.
Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); In re Barry,
445 So. 2d 365, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738,
742 (Wash. 1983) (en banc); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663. But see In re
Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (Ill. 1989) (questioning the bounds
of a federal constitutional right of privacy); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209,
1223 (N.J. 1985) (recognizing the possible applicability of a privacy right, but
basing its decision on a right of self-determination); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d
64, 70 (N.Y. 1981) (declining to base a right to refuse treatment on a
constitutional right of privacy).
29. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425. The court surveyed various state deci-
sions and concluded that states articulate four major interests: "(1) the
preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties;https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/16
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whose death the state cannot prevent, and an individual whose
illness is curable. 0 Accordingly, the court concluded that because
the state can only prolong a terminally ill patient's dying process,
countervailing state interests are severely diminished.3'
California's Natural Death Act 32 implicitly supports the
Saikewicz principle that state countervailing interests play a
minimal role in a terminally ill patient's decisions regarding
death. The Natural Death Act permits a competent, terminally
ill individual to execute an advance directive 3 for the withhold-
ing or withdrawing of life-sustaining procedures. In Barber v.
(3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the
medical profession." Id. at 424-25. The countervailing state interests the
Saikewicz court identified do not constitute a comprehensive list of state
interests. See Eaton & Larson, supra note 22, at 1259 n.43. Of the four
interests, the court identified preservation of life as a state's paramount
interest. 370 N.E.2d at 425. At least one court has added to the list of state
interests an interest in "encouraging the charitable and humane care of those
whose lives may be artificially extended under conditions which have the
prospect of providing at least a modicum of quality living." McKay v.
Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 621 (Nev. 1990).
30. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26.
31. Id. at 426.
32. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7194.5 (West Supp. 1993).
Relevant portions of the Natural Death Act provide:
(a) The Legislature finds that an adult person has the funda-
mental right to control the decisions [regarding] his or her own
medical care, including the decision to have life-sustaining medical
treatment withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal con-
dition or permanent unconscious condition.
(c) The Legislature further finds that, in the interests of pro-
tecting individual autonomy, such prolongation of the process of
dying for a person with a terminal condition or permanent un-
conscious condition for whom medical treatment does not improve
the prognosis for recovery may violate patient dignity and cause
unnecessary pain and suffering, while providing nothing medically
necessary or beneficial to the person.
(d) In recognition of the dignity and privacy that a person has
a right to expect, the Legislature hereby declares that the laws of
the State of California recognize the right of an adult person to
make a written declaration instructing his or her physician to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment in the event of a
terminal condition or permanent unconscious condition, in the
event that the person is unable to make those decisions for himself
or herself.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7185.5 (West Supp. 1993).
33. California courts, however, have discredited the Act's advance directive
provisions as cumbersome. See, e.g., Bartling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224 n.5;
Barler, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 489. Specifically, these courts have focused on one
Code provision that requires the patient to wait 14 days after diagnosis of a
terminal illness before executing an advance directive. Bartling, 209 Cal. Rptr.
at 224 n.5.
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Superior Court,34 however, the California Court of Appeals
allowed the family members of a comatose patient who failed
to execute an advance directive to order the termination of life-
sustaining treatment.3 5 The court reasoned that legislative dec-
larations and state common law make it clear that doctors do
not have a duty to prolong the moment of death merely because
they have the technology to do So. 36 The court concluded that
patients may remain the ultimate decision-makers even if they
fall to execute advance directives as the Act requires. 37
After Barber, California courts continued to defer to patients'
decisions to forego or withdraw from life-sustaining treatment.
In Bartling v. Superior Court,38 the California Court of Appeals
deferred to the decision of a competent, non-terminally ill patient
to withdraw from life-sustaining procedures.39 The court held40
that California law did not prohibit it from extending the right
to refuse treatment to non-terminal patients with a poor prog-
nosis. 4' The court reasoned that neither the Natural Death Act
34. 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
35. Id. at 489-90. The petitioners in the case were doctors accused of
murder and conspiracy to commit murder for removing an incompetent
person's life support system at his family's request. Id. at 486. The court held
that although the patient did not execute an advance directive, the patient,
through his family, had a right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. Id. at
492-93. Thus, the court concluded that the doctors were not guilty of murder
or conspiracy to commit murder. Id. at 493.
36. The court stressed that the focal point of the inquiry regarding the
permissibility of state intervention in the case of an incompetent person should
be the patient's prognosis. Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492. Under this analysis,
the permissibility of state intervention turns on the "reasonable possibility of
[the patient's] return to cognitive and sapient life . . . ." Id. Absent this
"reasonable possibility," a state's interest in intervening is severely discounted.
Id.
37. Id. at 489.
38. 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
39. Id. at 224. The patient, William Bartling, was seriously ill but had not
yet been diagnosed as terminal. Id. at 220. Bartling died before the court of
appeals heard the case. Id. at 221. The court nevertheless addressed the case
to prevent a recurrence of the dilemma both the patient and attending
physicians faced. Id.
40. The court stated that if Bartling had lived, it would have ordered that
he was free to either remain in the hospital or go home. Bartling, 209 Cal.
Rptr. at 226 n.8. The court further stated that it would restrain any person
from interfering with his decision. Id.
Underscoring this point, the California Natural Death Act requires physicians
opposed to the withdrawal of life support systems to transfer the patient to
another physician or health care provider. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
7190 (West Supp. 1993).
41. Bartling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
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nor common law prohibits competent persons from foregoing
medical treatment. 42 The court applied the same reasoning43 to
a non-terminal, competent patient that Barber and Saikewicz
previously applied to comatose and terminally ill patients."
Bouvia v. Superior Court further advanced the principle that
a competent, non-terminal patient may refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment. In Bouvia, the California Court of Appeals
held that a competent quadriplegic" had the right to require
removal of a nasogastric feeding tube that provided her with
hydration and nutrition. 47 The court reasoned that the quality
of Bouvia's life while connected to a life support system was as
important as the length of time the treatment could keep her
alive.48 Emphasizing that Bouvia's condition was irreversible and
42. Id. at 225-26. The court went further by stating that: "[In the absence
of legislative guidance, we find no legal requirement that prior judicial approval
is necessary before any decision to withdraw treatment can be made." Id. at
226 (quoting Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal Ct. App.
1983)). Contra McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 630-31 (Nev. 1990) (requiring
non-terminal patients to secure judicial approval before life-sustaining treat-
ment can be withheld or withdrawn).
43. The Bartling opinion paved the way for California's "quality of life"
policy by failing to distinguish between the state's interest in preserving the
life of a terminal or comatose patient and preserving the life of a non-terminal,
competent patient. See Bartling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 193 (concluding that the
trial court had incorrectly limited the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment
to comatose, terminally ill patients).
44. Id. at 226 (citing Barber and Saikewicz).
45. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
46. Elizabeth Bouvia was a 28 year old quadriplegic suffering from severe
cerebral palsy. Bouvia had previously expressed the desire to die, and on one
occasion attempted to starve herself to death. Id. at 299-300.
47. Id. at 305. The court, by merging the state interest of preventing
suicide into its interest in preserving life, dodged the difficult question of
whether refusing to continue life-sustaining treatment constitutes suicide. For
thoughtful commentary addressing moral and ethical difficulties involved in
competent patients' end-of-life decisions, see Martha A. Matthews, Comment,
Suicidal Competence and the Patients's Right to Refuse Lifesaving Treatment,
75 CAL. L. REV. 707 (1987) (discussing the consequences of allowing competent
yet suicidal patients to withdraw from life-sustaining treatment); Bruce C.
Morris, Compelling A Competent Adult To Submit To Medical Treatment:
An Argument Against Antidysthanasia, 16 FORUM 911 (1981) (arguing that
because no person facing death is truly "competent" to request the right to
die, courts and hospitals should err on the side of life); Alan A. Stone M.D.,
The Right To Die: New Problems For Law and Medicine and Psychiatry, 37
EMORY L.J. 627 (1988) (commenting on the complex issues that the right to
die cases give rise to and the often compelling interests of the medical and
legal professions).
48. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304. One argument is that it is a mistake
for courts to attach importance to the amount of time available to the patient.
Id. Under this analysis, the dispositive question is whether, given the irrevers-
19941
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that the state's proposed treatment was painful and demeaning, 49
the court concluded that Bouvia's individual interest outweighed
countervailing state interests.50 The court found that permitting
the state to intervene5 in Bouvia's decision to withdraw from
life-sustaining treatment impermissibly intruded on her funda-
mental rights of privacy and self-determination.5 2
In the prison context, an additional layer of state interest
further limits an individual's ability to control bodily integrity.
In Commissioner of Correction v. Myers,53 the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that state prison officials could force a
prisoner to continue hemodialysis5 4 to prevent the prisoner's
death.5 5 The court reasoned that unique prison interests in
maintaining institutional security, rehabilitating prisoners, and
preserving prison order56 warranted state intervention in the
prisoner's decision to forego treatment.5 7 The court authorized
ibility of the patient's condition, she considers her life meaningless. Id.
This argument, however, fails to take into account the possibility of ad-
vancements in technology which could provide a cure or a better life support
system. See generally Michael R. Flick, Comment, The Due Process of Dying,
79 CAL. L. REv. 1121, 1157 (1991) (commenting that it is difficult to make
the "right" decision because such decisions are final, leaving no room to
prove the decision wrong).
49. If force fed, Bouvia would live for an additional 15 to 20 years.
Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304. Her condition is such, however, that medical
staff would have to constantly administer morphine to ease the pain related
to feeding. Id. at 305. As a result, Bouvia would have to endure 15 to 20
years of immobility while others fed, cleaned, and turned her. Id.
50. Id.
51. California, therefore, discounts the paramount state interest developed
in Saikewicz - preserving the life of a non-terminal, competent individual -
when the individual's condition is irreversible and treatment is painful and
intrusive. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305. See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
52. The court stated that "we cannot conceive it to be the policy of
[California] to inflict such an ordeal upon anyone." 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
Ironically, after the decision was handed down, Bouvia decided to continue
the life-sustaining treatments. For a thoughtful discussion about the implica-
tions of Bouvia and the medical profession, see Flick, supra note 48, at 1127-
28 (arguing that if Elizabeth Bouvia had died, she would not have had any
choice to make at all and that she "did not want to die, she wanted to be
wanted").
53. 399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1979).
54. Hemodialysis is a process by which a machine acts in place of a
person's kidney, pumping blood out of the body to a mechanical filter and
then returning it to the body. Id. at 454.
55. The physician attending the prisoner estimated that without hemodi-
alysis, the prisoner would live no longer than 15 days with prescribed medi-
cation. If he refused both the hemodialysis and the medication, he could
survive only three to five days. Id.
56. Myers, 399 N.E.2d at 457.
57. To determine if the prisoner's refusal to undergo hemodialysis consti-
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prison officials to administer life-saving medical treatment that
the state would be prohibited from administering to non-prison-
ers.58
The California Penal Code, 9 however, guarantees that pri-
soners shall retain their constitutional rights except to the extent
that restrictions are necessary to protect public safety or insti-
tutional security.w In Keyhea v. Rushen,61 the California Court
of Appeals held that the Penal Code prohibits the state from
subjecting state prisoners to long-term involuntary psychotropic
medication 62 without a judicial determination of competency. 63
The court implemented a two prong test to determine whether
the state had violated the Code.6 First, the court determined
whether non-prisoners would have a right to a competency
tuted a threat to prison integrity, the court considered the prisoner's motive
in refusing treatment. Id. at 457-58. Contra Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306
(stating that the trial court seriously erred by considering the patient's motives
in refusing life-sustaining treatment). In this instance, the court determined
that the prisoner refused treatment to improperly gain a transfer to a prison
with lower security. Myers, 399 N.E.2d at 454.
58. Myers, 399 N.E.2d at 458. Given the nature of hemodialysis treatment,
it is as intrusive a life-sustaining procedure as artificial feeding. See id. at
457. However, countervailing prison interests still tipped the balance in favor
of state-mandated medical intervention. Id.
Later courts have applied Myers to cases in which the prisoner did not have
an underlying disease or condition. See, e.g., In re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 231
(N.H. 1984) (permitting prison to force feed prisoner who was starving
himself); Von Holden v. Chapman, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)
(same); Department of Pub. Welfare v. Kallinger, 580 A.2d 887, 891 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990) (permitting prison officials to force feed a suicidal pris-
oner); White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54, 57 (W. Va. 1982) (permitting prison
officials to force feed a prisoner on a hunger strike). But see Zant v. Prevatte,
286 S.E.2d 715, 717 (Ga. 1982) (using right of privacy principles to prohibit
prison officials from force feeding starving prisoner, absent a threat to prison
security).
59. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West 1982).
60. By instituting section 2600 of the Penal Code, the California Legislature
embraced the principle that prisoners no longer suffer "civil death." See In
re Harrell, 470 P.2d 640, 655, 658 (Cal. 1970) (en banc) (interpreting section
2600 as prisoners' bill of rights).
61. 223 Cal. Rptr. 746 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
62. Psychotropic or antipsychotic drugs such as thorazine, prolixin, stela-
zinc, serentil, quide, tindal, compazine, trilafon, tractan, navane, hadol,
moban, and vesprin are used for treating serious mental disorders. Id. at 747.
See Sheldon Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugs, Professionalism, and the Con-
stitution, 72 GEO. L.J. 1725 (1984) (discussing modern medicine for mental
disorders). These drugs have taken the place of earlier measures such as
lobotomy, insulin shock, and electroshock. Keyhea, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
63. Keyhea, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
64. The court rejected the state's argument that section 2600 of the Penal
Code protects constitutional rights and does not extend to statutory rights.
Id. at 749. The court concluded that section 2600 provides protection to
1994]
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hearing.6 5 Second, the court balanced prisoners' interests against
countervailing state interests to determine whether competency
hearings for prisoners threatened prison security." The court
found that a judicial competency hearing posed no threat to
prison security.67 Because Keyhea equated the Penal Code to a
prisoner's "bill of rights," prisoners have the same rights as
non-prisoners when exercise of these rights does not threaten
prison security."8
Thor v. Superior Cour 69 provided the California Supreme
Court an opportunity to underscore California's commitment to
protecting the personal autonomy of individuals in making end-
of-life decisions, irrespective of an individual's status as a pris-
oner. Prison officials must now prove that it is both reasonable
and necessary to administer life-sustaining medical treatment to
competent, unconsenting prisoners.70 In the absence of mitigating
circumstances that render involuntary treatment reasonable and
necessary, prison interests are severely discounted. 7' Accordingly,
the Thor court discounted prison interests in mandating treat-
ment because the doctor failed to show that the prisoner's refusal
to submit to treatment constituted a threat to prison security. 72
The court declared that the prisoner was entitled to the same
right-of-refusal as a non-prisoner in his condition. 73
The Thor court relied primarily on Bouvia and its progeny to
determine the scope of the prisoner's right-of-refusal as a com-
prisoner's rights to the extent that those rights do not undermine prison
integrity. Id.
65. Id. at 750-55. The court determined that non-prisoners had the right
to a competency hearing under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, which provides
certain procedural requirements for institutions administering long-term psy-
chotropic medication. Id. at 751. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5000 (West
Supp. 1993).
66. Keyhea, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 755.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 750.
69. 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
70. Thor, 855 P.2d at 388.
71. Id. The existence of mitigating circumstances will cause a court to
defer to the experience and expertise of prison administrators. Id. See supra
notes 57-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of circumstances war-
ranting state intervention in prisoner's refusal of life-sustaining treatment.
72. Thor, 855 P.2d at 388. The court further determined that a prison
physician's statutory duty to care for prisoners is discharged once a competent
prisoner refuses medical treatment. Id. at 386. See also supra note 12 for a
discussion of Thor's posited duty under California law and under the federal
constitution. Thus, once a prisoner discharges a physician from his duty to
care for the prisoner, the physician cannot be liable for "deliberate indiffer-
ence." Id.
73. Thor, 855 P.2d at 388.https://openscholarship.wustl.e u/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/16
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petent quadriplegic. 74 Focusing on the irreversible nature of the
prisoner's condition," the court determined that unlike the state
of Missouri, 76 California has not adopted a policy "of preserving
life at the expense of personal autonomy."7 Thus, the court
considered the quality of the prisoner's life without considering
the limitations his status as a prisoner had already placed on
his personal autonomy.
7 8
The Thor court's denial of the doctor's request to artificially
feed and medicate the prisoner without his consent comports
with California common law, statutory law, and state policy.
79
As such, Thor is a natural progression in California's trend
toward greater personal autonomy for competent individuals
making end-of-life decisions.80 Furthermore, Thor illustrates Cal-
ifornia's retreat from the near-extinct principle of "civil death"
for prisoners8 by including prisoners in its progression towards
greater personal autonomy in end-of-life decisions.
82
In advancing California's goals of greater personal autonomy
for all, however, Thor leaves troubling questions in its wake.
74. See id. at 380-83.
75. The prisoner, like Elizabeth Bouvia, would have to spend the rest of
his days being "fed, bathed and turned by others." Id. at 379. Several
commentators argue, however, that the dispositive question is not whether the
prisoner has an underlying affliction. Rather, these commentators propose
that the inquiry should be the same irrespective of the underlying events which
caused the prisoner to need life-sustaining medical treatment in the first
instance. See, e.g., Joel K. Greenberg, Note, Hunger Striking Prisoners: The
Constitutionality Of Force-Feeding, 51 FoRDHAm L. REV. 747, 763 (1983)
(arguing that a prison should not use its duty to care for prisoners as a
"sword to intrude on a prisoner's privacy"); Kathleen L. Johnson, Note, The
Death Row Right To Die: Suicide or Intimate Decision?, 54 S. CAL. L. Rv.
575, 604 (1981) (drawing a comparison between a death row inmate's assertion
of a right to die by refusing to appeal and a terminal patient's right to refuse
treatment); Stephanie C. Powell, Comment, Constitutional Law - Forced
Feeding of a Prisoner on a Hunger Strike: A Violation of an Inmate's Right
To Privacy, 61 N.C. L. Rv. 714, 732 (1983) (arguing that absent threat to
prison security, prisoners are entitled to same right of privacy as non-prisoners).
76. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Cruzan case and Missouri's articulated policy of preserving life.
77. Thor, 855 P.2d at 384.
78. But cf. Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass.
1979) (emphasizing the limitations on the prisoner's autonomy rather than the
quality of his life on dialysis).
79. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of
California's quality of life policy.
80. California has stopped short of permitting a competent person to seek
out the help of another to commit suicide. See Donaldson v. Lundgren, 4
Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 63-64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that petitioner's right
to die did not encompass a right to state-assisted suicide).
81. See supra note 60 for a discussion of section 2600 of California's Penal
Code.
82. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of state
policy.
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Specifically, Thor provides no framework for determining the
point that a competent, viable individual's refusal to continue
life support constitutes suicide.83 Moreover, Thor sets a danger-
ous precedent by conferring the right to refuse treatment on
prisoners with an "underlying affliction," while denying the
right-of-refusal to non-afflicted prisoners.84 In granting protected
class status to afflicted prisoners, Thor provides an incentive
for unafflicted prisoners to thwart prison objectives by maiming
themselves as a means of joining the protected class. Although
Thor purports to ensure equal protection to prisoners exercising
their right to die, the case will ultimately result in excessive
weight given to prisoners' interests compared to the interests of
the state.
The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that because medical
technology allows doctors to suspend the moment of death,
states must play an increased role in the end-of-life decisions of
their citizens.85 In the prison context, the state's role in an
individual's end-of-life decision is further increased by the ad-
ditional state interest in maintaining prison security. Although
prisoners have a liberty interest in refusing medical treatment,
the state has greater latitude to intervene in prisoners' end-of-
life decisions. In Thor, however, the California Supreme Court
diminished the ability of California prisons to intervene in
prisoners' end-of-life decisions by creating an exception in the
case of afflicted prisoners. Accordingly, Thor opens the door
to erosion of prison interests vis-A-vis the interests of prisoners.
Shirley A. Padmore*
83. But see McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990) (providing a
comprehensive procedural mechanism for right to die cases involving competent
patients). For further discussion of the Bergstedt mechanism, see Eaton &
Larson, supra note 22, at 1273-75.
84. See supra note 16 for a discussion of the court's reluctance to extend
the holding to voluntary starvation and hunger-striking prisoners.
85. See supra note 23 for a discussion of the Supreme Court's reason for
turning the issue over to the "laboratory" of the states.
* J.D. 1995, Washington University.
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